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SELECTIVE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION: DIVINE WILL
AND LEGISLATIVE GRACE
Hugh C. Macgill*
A MAN who is willing to bear arms against whomever his govern-
ment declares ought to be fought is in no conflict with the polit-
ical system of which he is a part. A man obedient to his government in
all temporal matters save participation in war, and who bases that ex-
ception on an extra-political allegiance owed principles derived from
"religious training and belief," is similarly accounted no threat to the
state. But difficult questions attend the conceptual status of a man
obedient to the state in all matters save participation in some wars, who
reserves to himself the right to decide which wars permit his par-
ticipation and demands that the political system accommodate him in
this respect. Is this man to be regarded as one imbued with a discriminat-
ing conscience, tolerable within the political system, or as a damned
rebel who substitutes his political judgment for that of the officers and
organs duly authorized to judge such matters?
Increasing numbers of people eligible for the draft assert a qualitative
difference between fighting Hitler and fighting Ho Chi Minh, and
profess themselves conscientiously opposed to participation in the war
in Vietnam. Two such persons have already appeared in the courts.1
As long as the United States alters neither its foreign policy nor its
system of conscription, more dissidents are likely to surface. Analysis
of this phenomenon, the "selective conscientious objector," compels an
assessment of the power-or the right-of the state to require an indi-
vidual to violate his own conscience, but to date the courts have not
given this problem the candid treatment it deserves. It may be useful,
then, to attempt a determination of the legal validity of an asserted
right of selective conscientious objection.
BACKGROUND OF THE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR EXEMPTION
The scope of the present exemption for conscientious objectors and
its underlying premises have developed through interaction of federal
*BA., 1965, Yale University; LL.B., 1968, University of Virginia; Reginald Heber
Smith Community Lawyer Fellow, Baltimore, 1968-69. Mr. Macgill served in the United
States Army from 1960 to 1963.
1 Noyd v. McNamara, 378 F.2d 538 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1022 (1967);
United States v. Kurki, 384 F.2d 905 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 926 (1968).
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statutes and court decisions concerning what constitutes religion and
what role religion plays in the political scheme.2 Congress first pro-
vided such an exemption in 1864 ,z and revised its standards in the Draft
Act of 1917.+ The 1917 statute exempted members of
any well-recognized religious sect or organization . .. whose existing
creed or principles forbid its members to participate in war in any
form and whose religious convictions are against war .... 5
This provision followed the 1864 statute in requiring both membership
in a "peace church" and personal adherence to that church's tenets, and
added the "war in any form" language-the requirement of total
pacifism.6
The exemption was broadened in the Selective Training and Service
Act of 1940 to cover anyone "who, by reason of religious training
and belief, is conscientiously opposed to war in any form." 8 Strenuous
efforts to broaden it still further by dropping the implicit requirement
of organized religious affiliation were rejected.
. 2 See generally NATIONAL SERVICE BOARD FOR RELIGIOUS OBJECTORS, CONGRESS LOOKS
AT THE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR (1943); 2 SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, SPECIAL MONOGRAPH
No. 11, BACKGROUNDS OF SLECTIVE SERVICE (1947); Conklin, Conscientious Objector Pro-
sisions: A View in the Light of Torcaso v. Watkins, 51 GEo. LJ. 252 (1963).
3 The statute extended the exemption to members of religious denominations
who shall by oath or affirmation declare that they are conscientiously opposed to
the bearing of arms, and who are prohibited from doing so by the rules and arti-
cles of faith and practice of said religious denominations ....
Act of Feb. 24, 1864, ch. 13, S 17, 13 Stat. 9. Those who qualified under the Act were
to be drafted as noncombatants or, in the alternative, might pay a commutation fee of
300 dollars. Id.
4Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, 40 Stat. 76.
5 Id. § 4, at 78. By Executive Order No. 2823, the exemption was extended to consci-
entious religious objectors without regard to affiliation with peace churches, Exec.
Order No. 2823 (1918), as under the 1940 Act. Selective Training and Service Act of
1940, ch. 720, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 889.
6 An effort was made in the Senate to extend the exemption to all persons opposed
to war by reason of conscience, rather than by conscience and sectarian affiliation, but
it failed to pass. 55 CONG. Rc. 1478-79 (1917).
7 Ch. 720, 54 Stat. 889.
8 Id. at § 5 (g).
9 The adopted language, proposed by the American Society of Friends, was preferred
by Congress over the American Civil Liberties Union's suggestion that anyone "consci-
entiously opposed to war in any form" should be entitled to the exemption. Hearings
on H.R. 10132 Before the House Comm. on Military Affairs, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 191, 211
(1940). Evidently Congress was willing to forego the requirement of peace church af-
filiation, but not to admit mere "conscience" as a permissible basis for claiming the
exemption. See Conklin, supra note 2, at 269-70.
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When the "religious training and belief" language came before the
courts, however, conflict developed over its breadth. In United States
v. Kauten,10 the Second Circuit had no trouble holding that an atheist
whose scruples against participation in World War II stemmed primarily
from an acute distaste for President Roosevelt was not within the ex-
empting language. But Judge Augustus Hand, in dictum, interpreted
the statute to confer an exemption on any individual whose "consci-
entious scruple against war in any form [was] a response.., to an in-
ward mentor, call it conscience or God... ." " Judge Hand's dictum,
which found the statute to be quite as broad as Congress clearly in-
tended it should not be, became the law of the Second Circuit in United
States ex rel. Reel v. Badt.12 The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, re-
mained true to congressional intent, holding in Berman v. United
States13 that "philosophy and morals and social policy without the con-
cept of deity cannot be said to be religion. . ." for purposes of exemp-
tion under the 1940 Act.14
10 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943).
]I Judge Hand's dictum read as follows:
[TIhe provisions of the present statute . . .take into account the characteristics
of a skeptical generation and make the existence of a conscientious scruple
against war in any form, rather than allegiance to a definite religious group or
creed, the basis of exemption ...
There is a distinction betveen a course of reasoning resulting in a convic-
tion that a particular war is inexpedient or disastrous and a conscientious ob-
jection to participation in any war under any circumstances. The latter, and
not the former, may be the basis of exemption under the Act. The former is
usually a political objection, while the latter, we think, may justly be regarded
as a response of the individual to an inward mentor, call it conscience or God,
that is for many persons at the present time the equivalent of what has al-
ways been thought a religious impulse.
Id. at 708.
For an expression of regret at the damage Judge Hand's language does to the idea of a
conscientious selective objector, see Potter, Conscientious Objection to Particular Wars,
4 RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER 44, 60-63 (1968). Dr. Potter describes the decision
as "a misstep possessing the marks of tragedy." Id. at 60.
12 141 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1944). The court described Reel as a philosophical humani-
tarian who did not believe in a deity, and testimony confirmed that he was not
religious. Despite these facts, the court held Reel entitled to the exemption. See also
United States ex rel. Phillips v. Downer, 135 F.2d 521, 524 (2d Cir. 1943), where the
facts were unclear but Judge Hand's dictum was treated as a rule permitting the in-
clusion of nontheistic humanists within the exemption.
13 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946).
14 Herman Berman's sincerity and conscientiousness were not contested, but Herman
Berman did not believe in God, nor even in a god. The court of appeals, with the
Second Circuit's decision in Kauten before it, held Berman not entitled to the exemp-
tion because
the expression "by reason of religious training and belief" is plain language,
1358 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 54:1355
The Supreme Court declined to hear the Berman case,1 leaving the
circuits in conflict. Congress, however, in its 1948 revision of the draft
laws, defined "religious training and belief" as "an individual's belief
in relation to a Supreme Being... "16 and continued its definition of the
phrase in language which implicitly endorsed the Berman decision.17 The
report of the Senate Armed Services Committee made it clear that such
an endorsement was intended,' 8 and it appeared from subsequent Ninth
and Second Circuit decisions that the 1948 Act had resolved their con-
flict.'9 As the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Ninth Circuit
and was written into the statute for the specific purpose of distinguishing be-
tween a conscientious social belief, or a sincere devotion to a high moralistic
philosophy, and one based upon an individual's belief in his responsibility to an
authority higher and beyond any worldly one.
There are those who have a philosophy of life, and who live up to it. There
is evidence that this is so in regard to appellant. However, no matter how pure
and admirable his standard may be, and no matter how devotedly he adheres
to it, his philosophy and morals and social policy without the concept of deity
cannot be said to be religion ....
Id. at 380-81.
15 329 U.S. 795 (1946).
'6Universal Military Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C. APi. § 456(j) (1964).
17 Religious Training and belief in this connection means an individual's belief in
relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any
human relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological or philo-
sophical views or a merely personal moral code.
Id.
18 This section reenacts substantially the same provisions as were found in sub-
section 5(g) of the 1940 act. Exemption extends to anyone who, because of
religious training and belief in his relation to a Supreme Being, is conscientiously
opposed to combatant military service or to both combatant and noncombatant
military service. (See United States v. Berman, 156 F.(2d) 377, certiorari denied,
329 U.S. 796 [sic].)
S. REP'. No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1948).
'9 In George v. United States, 196 F.2d 445 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 843
(1952), the Ninth Circuit went somewhat beyond the grounds immediately necessary
to its decision to discuss Congress' meaning. Since George's opposition derived from a
belief in God, the permissibility of distinguishing between believers and nonbelievers
was not in issue. The court nevertheless stated that the Supreme Being clause reflected
the notion of "Religion" as it has commonly and traditionally been understood in this
country, id. at 451, and declared that a classification based on that understanding "would
meet all the accepted tests of due process." Id. at 452. In a later case directly challenging
the constitutionality of such a classification, the court found its decision in George con-
trolling. Clark v. United States, 236 F.2d 13 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 882 (1956).
It appeared that the Second Circuit had fallen into line in United States v. Bendik,
220 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1955), where the distinction between religious and nonreligious
believers (or theists and nontheists) was upheld on the grounds that the exemption was
a matter of legislative grace and could be conditioned as Congress saw fit.
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cases, 20 that court's construction of Congress' definition of "religion"
in the context of conscientious objector exemptions seemed to be estab-
lished beyond challenge.
Despite this state of outward calm, tensions between the points of
view described above remained unresolved. There was no split be-
tween the Ninth Circuit and Congress, on one hand, and the Second
Circuit, on the other, about the basic premise underlying conscientious
objection: the objection must derive from a sphere higher than the au-
thority which issues commands of the state-in the language of Berman,
from "an authority higher and beyond any worldly one." 21 To Con-
gress and the Ninth Circuit, "higher and beyond" meant a vertical re-
lationship with the source of one's belief-"the concept of deity." 22
This vertical relationship is the traditional American understanding of
"religion" and, consequently, of "religious training and belief."23 It is
also the principle of conscientious objection in a nutshell. Where state
power and individual belief collide in the same sphere, the state pre-
vails, but where individual belief derives from allegiance to the will of
God, the spheres are not the same and, conceptually, there is no col-
lision.u This conceptualization was the premise of the Ninth Circuit in
Berman and of Congress in enacting the 1948 draft law.-5 Without re-
quiring affirmation of such a vertical relationship from the objector,
continues the argument, it is not only administratively difficult to filter
out "merely personal moral codes," but also, by the traditional Ameri-
20 See note 19 supra.
21 Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377, 380 (9th Cir. 1946).
22d. at 380-81.
2 3 See note 19 supra.
24 See United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 627 (1931), where Chief Justice
Hughes, in a famous dissent, stated:
When one's belief collides with the power of the State, the latter is supreme
within its sphere and submission or punishment follows. But, in the forum of
conscience, duty to a moral power higher than the State has always been main-
tained. The reservation of that supreme obligation, as a matter of principle,
would unquestionably be made by many of our conscientious and law-abiding
citizens. . . . One cannot speak of religious liberty, with proper appreciation
of its essential and historic significance, without assuming the existence of a
belief in supreme allegiance to the will of God.
Id. at 633-34.
2 5 Herman Berman's petition for certiorari, which was denied, characterized the Mac-
intosh dissent as "naive anthropomorphism in religion based upon a two-story universe
theory." Brief for Petitioner at 23, Berman v. United States, 329 U.S. 795 (1946), quoted
in Conidin, supra note 2, at 273 (1963). Regarding Congress' expression of the
vertical relationship premise through the "Supreme Being" requirement, see note 17
supra.
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can understanding of religion, any system of belief to which such af-
firmation is irrelevant is a "merely personal moral code." 26
In Kauten Judge Hand similarly sought an authority "higher and
beyond," but in a sense neither spatial nor traditional. He took into ac-
count "the characteristics of a skeptical generation" according to which
"a response of the individual to an inward mentor, call it conscience or
God," may be "for many persons at the present time the equivalent of
what has always been thought a religious impulse." 27 The issue initially
creating the tension between the circuits, then, was whether objection
to participation in war proceeding from "an inward mentor" could
be said to be founded on "religious training and belief." If the answer
were no, there would be no further problem. If the answer were yes,
a further problem would be whether the Supreme Being clause limited
the exemption to objections stemming from externally compelled be-
liefs, to the exclusion of ones internally derived. If the clause did not
compel such a distinction, inquiry and tension would end. If such a
distinction were compelled, however, it would then be necessary to
determine whether the distinction was constitutionally permissible.
PRESENTATION OF THE CONFLICT: United States v. Seeger
In 1964 the Second Circuit decided United States v. Seeger and de-
clared the 1948 Act unconstitutional.2 8 Daniel Seeger based his opposi-
tion to participation in war on beliefs internally derived rather than
externally compelled. He described those beliefs, in part, as follows:
Personally, I do not believe that life derives any meaning from cosmic
design but I do believe that a person can give his life meaning by doing
something worthwhile with it, i.e. by relating his existence in a con-
structive and compassionate way to the problems of his social environ-
ment. In this sense pacifism, among other things, is for me a transcen-
dent concern and it is in this respect that I consider myself religious.2
2 6See United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846, 853 (2d Cir. 1964) (the government's
argument), aff'd, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
27 United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1943). Compare Judge Hand's
"call it conscience or God" language with Stone, The Conscientious Objector, 21 COLum.
U.Q. 253 (1919), where mere "conscience" and "religious experience" are distinguished,
id. at 263, and then treated interchangeably. Id. at 269.
28 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964).
29 Record at 99, United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (emphasis added).
Seeger also writes, id. at 93, that "action taken through fear of God or desire for
eternal reward is not moral conduct but merely expediency." This strikes at the
literally fundamental notion of the traditional view that the surest guaranty of" the
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The sincerity of Seeger's creed and its derivation from "religious train-
ing and belief" within the meaning of Kauten were not contested. The
Government argued, however, that his claim fell outside the coverage
of the 1948 statute because it was not founded "on a belief in a Supreme
Being." 30
Faced with these facts, the court wrote an opinion which pervasively
explored the constitutional issues surrounding conscientious objection.
It first noted that whether or not Congress was constitutionally com-
pelled to grant an exemption to conscientious objectors, no legislative
power existed to place unconstitutional conditions upon the conferral."1
Having arrived at the question of the statute's constitutionality, the
court proceeded to place the issue in a first amendment framework.
The Government, reasoned the court, based its argument for the stat-
ute's validity upon Supreme Court interpretations of the relationship
between the establishment and free exercise clauses.32 The high Court's
definition construed the establishment clause to compel neutrality but
not adversity towards religion." Avoiding adversity, continued the
Second Circuit, was necessary to escape conflict with the free exercise
clause by "treading upon the individual citizen's right. . ." to practice
his religion.3 4 Viewed in the context of this first amendment tension,
the Government's argument amounted to an assertion that the 1948
Act had merely created the greatest possible latitude for the free ex-
ercise of religion through conscientious objection.3 5
conscientiousness of a believer's pacifism is his fear of retribution by a vengeful
Supreme Being, with whom the believer stands in a vertical relationship.
30 United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846, 848 (2d Cir. 1964).
31 Id. at 851.
321d. at 851-52.
33See, e.g., Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1 (1946). In Everson Justice Black stated:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least
this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another.
Id. at 15. That case involved use of public tax money to transport school children,
including parochial school students. That use was permitted on the grounds that
while it might violate the establishment clause to allow the tax, to exclude believers
from its benefits because of their faith would "hamper" them in the free exercise of
their religion. A distinction among religions would, under that view, violate the
establishment clause, and to deny Seeger a conscientious objector exemption because
of his lack of a belief in a Supreme Being would be repugnant to the free exercise
clause.
34United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846, 852 (2d Cir. 1964); see School Dist. of
Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 247 (1963) (concurring opinion of Brennan, J.).
35 United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846, 852 (2d Cir. 1964).
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The Second Circuit then found a basic fallacy in the Government's
conception of the statute. If a statute's purpose is to protect the free
exercise of religion, it must protect the free exercise of all religions,
avoiding discrimination in this peculiarly sensitive area.36 The 1948
Act defined "religion" as belief in a Supreme Being; precedent com-
pelled concluding that such a definition could not "embrace all those
faiths which can validly claim to be called 'religious.' " " Thus the statute
only protected the free exercise of a few chosen religions and there-
fore constituted a discriminatory classification violative of the due
process clause of the fifth amendment.3 8
Seeger and the 1948 Act reached the Supreme Court in consolidation
with two other cases." In light of the Second Circuit's opinion and its
36Id.
371d. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). Torcaso involved a provision
of the Maryland constitution which disqualified from public office anyone who would
not affirm his belief in the existence of God. Torcaso refused and was denied a notary
public's commission. The Court struck down the state requirement in an opinion by
Justice Black which stated that neither the federal nor the state governments "can aid
those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions
founded on different beliefs." Id. at 495. In a footnote Justice Black listed "Buddhism,
Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others" as sects which did not teach a
belief in a Supreme Being but were nevertheless patently religious. Id. at 495 n.11.
This holding was taken by some commentators to invalidate, by implication, the Su-
preme Being clause of section 456(j) as an establishment of theistic religion. See, e.g.,
Conklin, supra note 2; Donnici, Governmental Encouragement of Religious Ideology:
A Study of the Current Conscientious Objector Exemption from Military Service, 13 J.
Pu. L. 16 (1964). Father Conklin believed that Torcaso compelled extension of the
exemption to nontheistic believers, but that this would do such violence to traditional
notions of "religion" that Congress might well repeal the exemption altogether.
38 United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846, 854 (2d Cir. 1964).
391n United States v. Jakobson, 325 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1963), the defendant could
not affirm a belief in a Supreme Being as such, but rather in a concept of "Godness"
which
could take one or the other of two forms, a "vertical" relationship in which
man relates directly to Godness, or a "horizontal" one in which man relates
to Godness indirectly by binding himself to the qualities of Godness that exist
in every creation in Mankind and throughout the world.
Id. at 412. The court dismissed Jakobson's indictment for refusal to submit to induction
in a decision whose reasoning reflected that of Kauten, twenty years earlier; the pos-
sibility that Congress might have added the Supreme Being language to narrow the
scope of the exemption under the 1948 Act was simply disregarded.
Peter v. United States, 324 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1963) was the third case resolved by
the Supreme Court in Seeger. The Ninth Circuit had applied the Supreme Being
clause literally in denying the exemption to Forest Peter, who, like Jacobson, was more
of a traditional theist than Daniel Seeger and clearly would have been treated like
Seeger had his case been decided in the Second Circuit. The three decisions, taken
together, presented the full spectrum of possible dispositions of the Supreme Being
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background of case law and legislative history, it is startling that Jus-
tice Clark's opinion for a unanimous Court read "Supreme Being" as a
gloss on "religious training and belief" rather than a limitation on it,
thereby bringing Daniel Seeger within the scope of the exemption by
statutory construction. It is even more startling that, to judge from Jus-
tice Clark's words, the Constitution did not figure at all in the Justices'
minds as they reached a decision.
The Court's inquiry focused upon the meaning of "Supreme Being,"
the stated alternatives being either "the orthodox God . . . or a faith,
'to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately de-
pendent.' "40 The existence of over 250 sects in this country was taken
to show "the care that Congress realized was necessary in the fashion-
ing of an exemption which would be in keeping with its long-estab-
lished policy of not picking and choosing among religions." 41 This
passage hints at the approach to be taken, an approach which becomes
more artful at each turning. Justice Clark found42 that Congress took
the Supreme Being language from its primary source, Chief Justice
Hughes' dissent in United States v. Macintosh,43 where the Chief Jus-
tice stated that "[o]ne cannot speak of religious liberty with proper ap-
preciation of its essential and historic significance, without assuming the
existence of a belief in supreme allegiance to the will of God." 4 Conse-
quently, the substitution of "Supreme Being" for "God" in the 1948
Act was interpreted by Justice Clark as a deliberate broadening of the
definition, with Congress' failure to elaborate "on the form or nature
of this higher authority" showing that it was mindful of Chief Justice
clause. In Peter it was held valid on its face, in Jakobson valid as construed, and in
Seeger invalid however construed.
40 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 174 (1965).
411d. at 175.
421d.
43 283 U.S. 605 (1931). The Naturalization Act of 1906, ch. 3592, S 4, 34 Stat. 596, 598,
required applicants for citizenship to swear to "support and defend the Constitution
and laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and bear true
faith and allegiance to the same." Macintosh qualified this oath by declaring that his
primary allegiance was to God, and that he could go to war in defense of the United
States only if the war were morally justifiable in terms of God's will. The Court held
this was not the meaning Congress intended the oath to have, adding that
unqualified allegiance to the Nation and submission and obedience to the laws
of the land, as well those made for war as those made for peace, are not in-
consistent with the will of God.
283 U.S. at 625.
44283 U.S. 627, 634 (1931) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting). Justices Holmes and Brandeis
joined the Chief Justice in dissent.
1968] 1363
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Hughes "when he said in the same opinion that even the word 'God'
had myriad meanings for men of faith." 45 Since the Senate report on
the bill stated specifically that section 6(j) was intended substantially
to reenact the provisions of the 1940 Act, and since that Act referred
only to "religious training and belief," the Seeger court found that "that
is all that is required here." 46 The clear effect of the Court's return to
the 1940 Act was to read "Supreme Being" out of the statute, and this
conclusion is reinforced by Justice Clark's definition of "religious train-
ing and belief":
[A]II sincere religious beliefs which are based upon a power or being,
or upon a faith, to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else
is ultimately dependent. The test might be stated in these words: A
sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor
a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying
for the exemption comes within the statutory definition.4 7
Suggesting the Court's reason for such a tortured interpretation of
the statute, Justice Clark added that "this construction avoids imputing
to Congress an intent to classify different religious beliefs, exempting
some and excluding others .... ,, 14 The meaning of this phrase is plain.
If "religious training and belief" were construed to say what Congress,
through the "Supreme Being" gloss, intended it to mean, and what the
Government urged upon the Court in this case, there would have been
no room for a judicial definition under the guise of statutory interpreta-
tion. The Court would have been obliged to abide by Congress' defini-
.45 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 175-76 (1965).
46 Id. at 176.
47 Id. A phrase of similarily dark ambiguity appears in the Court's explanation of
how it came about that neither the Supreme Being clause nor the citation to Berman at
the end of it in the Senate report, see note 18 supra, implied an adoption of the holding
in that case. The Court said that "[sluch a claim will not bear scrutiny.... [Wie think
it clear that an explicit statement of congressional intent deserves more weight than
the parenthetical citation of a case which might stand for a number of things." 380
U.S. at 177. The opinion goes on to declare that "Congress' action in citing it must be
construed in such a way as to make it consistent with its express statement that it
meant substantially to re-enact the 1940 provision." Id. at 178 (emphasis added).
Having decided what "must" be done, Justice Clark proceeded to do it, by finding
that in both Kauten and Berman political, social and moral views were held beyond
the ambit of the exemption, which was denied in both cases on that ground; therefore,
and because certiorari was denied in Berman, "we think that rather than citing Berman
for what it said 'religious belief was, Congress cited it for what it said 'religious belief'
was not." Id. at 178-79.
48 Id. at 176.
1364 [Vol. 54:1355
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don or strike it down on constitutional grounds in order to substitute
one of its own. The transparency of the fiction that Seeger is merely a
matter of interpreting the statute is tacitly admitted in Justice Douglas'
concurring opinion. Stating the consequences of a statutory construc-
tion other than that developed by the Court, he observes that
then those who embraced one religious faith rather than another would
be subject to penalties; and that kind of discrimination, as we held in
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, would violate the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment. It would also result in a denial of
equal protection by preferring some religions over others-an invidious
discrimination that would run afoul of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497.
... [I]t is, in my opinion, not a tour de force if we construe the
words "Supreme Being" to include the cosmos, as well as an anthro-
pomorphic entity. If it is a tour de force so to hold, it is no more so
than other instances where we have gone to extremes to construe an
Act of Congress to save it from demise on constitutional grounds. In
a more extreme case than the present one we said that the words of a
statute may be strained "in the candid service of avoiding a serious con-
stitutional doubt." United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 47.49
THE "RuIE" oF Seeger
The constitutional underpinnings of Seeger are sufficiently apparent,
even without Justice Douglas' implied threats, to justify treating the
rule it promulgates as the minimum permissible scope of the consci-
entious objector exemption." Although the Court would probably balk
49 Id. at 188. The brief submitted for Jakobson, who had profited in the court below
from such a "straining" of the words of this statute, urged
In accordance with the established rule, every effort should be made to con-
strue the statutory language 'in the candid service of avoiding a serious con-
stitutional doubt.' United States v. Rwnly [sic], 345 U.S. 42, 47. Brief for Jakob-
son, No. 51, at 21, United States 'v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
50The 1967 amendment to the statute, 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1967), omits the
Supreme Being language, but this revision does not necessarily indicate congressional
acquiescence in Seeger. The House report states only that
. . . the committee language requires that the claim for conscientious objection
be based on "religious training and belief" as has been the original intent of Con-
gress in drafting this provision of the law.
H.R. REP. No. 267, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1967). It is stated in the Conference
Report that "the Senate conferees also concurred in the desire of the House language
to more narrowly construe the basis for classifying registrants as 'conscientious ob-
jectors.'" CoNF. RFP. No. 346, at 9 (1967).
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if Seeger were urged upon it as binding constitutional precedent, the
case does afford a sound basis from which to extrapolate the principles
the Court would apply should other cases come before it on unavoid-
ably constitutional grounds.
The Court excludes from the exemption only persons who "disavow
religious belief" and base their opposition to participation in war on
"essentially political, sociological or economic considerations" or on a
'"merely personal moral code." 51 The problem, however, is to ascer-
tain what it is that an objector must show in the matrix of his be-
liefs for them to be considered religious.
The Court's opinion leads one to the conclusion that a concept of
ultimate dependence or subordination is in fact the basis of the Seeger
rule.52 Justice Clark, contemplating Daniel Seeger's exemplary personal
qualities and dedication to social welfare, was "reminded" of the fol-
lowing quotation from Tillich:
And if that word [God] has not much meaning for you, translate it,
and speak of the depths of your life, of the source of your being, of
your ultimate concern, of what you take seriously without any reserva-
tion.5 3
Earlier in the opinion, another quotation from Tillich was offered to il-
lustrate the all-encompassing scope of the offered test:
The source of ... affirmation of meaning within meaninglessness, of
certitude within doubt, is not the God of traditional theism but the
51 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 173 (1965). It is not clear if this "disavowal"
must be affirmative or, if so, how irreligion can be proved against one who claims to be
religious.
52 The Court's expression of its test as requiring that the claimed belief occupy "a
place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God
of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption," id. at 166, is not helpful. It may be
more illuminating to take the dictionary definition of theism quoted by Justice Clark:
"Does the term 'Supreme Being' as used in § 6(j) mean the orthodox God or the
broader concept of a power or being, or a faith, 'to which all else is subordinate or
upon which all else is ultimately dependent'?", id. at 174, as indicative of what the
Court had in mind. That definition identifies the principle from which orthodox beliefs
and moral codes not "merely personal" both derive; it is a sounder starting point for
discussion than the Court's "God or equivalent" language, which appears to contemplate
a Cinderella test by which a claimant to religious status must squeeze his foot into the
shoe of one whose status is already recognized.
53 P. TmLIcH, Tin SHAmNG oF m FouNDATiON 57 (1948), quoted in 380 U.S. at
187 (emphasis added by the Court).
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"God above God," the power of being, which works through those
who have no name for it, not even the name God.54
The Court, then, construed belief in a "Supreme Being" to mean theism,
and theism to mean a belief, however inarticulate, which refers to an
ultimate concern.
If "ultimateness" is a subjective notion, varying infinitely according
to the preoccupations of different people, it can be argued that the
Court, in its effort to remedy the present statute's vulnerability to con-
stitutional attack, not only brought all "religion" within the scope of
the exemption but in effect eliminated "religion" as a consideration al-
together. Assuming that the "God above God" of Tillich, endorsed by
the Court, does work through everyone, its manifestation in any par-
ticular person will be discovered in that which he takes "seriously with-
out any reservation." The Court's articulation of this standard suggests
that anyone who takes something "seriously without any reservation"
could qualify for the exemption if that "something" compels pacifism.
Furthermore, it can be argued that everyone has some such ultimate
concern; if that were all Seeger required, the Pope, Mao-tse Tung and
Ayn Rand would all qualify as religious, if not pacifist. Conceivably a
man whose sincere and ultimate concern was his bank account could
avoid military service if he would lose income by performing it. If the
Seeger rule could not be invoked to exclude such a registrant, the test
would be completely subjective and religion would be immaterial to
eligibility for the exemption. Under this interpretation the selective ob-
jector with genuinely religious motivation would be deprived of a first
amendment basis for attacking his exclusion from exemption-a sub-
stantial deprivation, as the first amendment is the strongest basis for any
judicial attempt to broaden the scope of the exemption as it now stands
or to compel its retention in the event Congress should decide to with-
draw it. If religion had been read out of the statute, it would be difficult
for the religious objector to attack it as denying him due process or as
abridging the free exercise of his religion.
Clearly the Court did not intend such a result, and these implications
may not correctly be read into Justice Clark's opinion. 5 The Court's
54p. TumLcH, II SYsrEa A-c TnEoLoGY 12 (1957), quoted in 380 U.S. at 180.
55 It has been asserted that
The Court's definition of theists is so broad that the only persons who might
be called atheists are nihilists and those who have not considered the meaning
of life sufficiently to have a belief regarding its meaning.
Note, Defining Religion: Of God, The Constitution and the D.A.R., 32 U. Cnm. L.
REv. 533, 552 (1965). The probable truth of this remark tends to support, rather than
refute, the proposition that Seeger did not read religion out of the statute.
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equation of religious belief with "ultimate concern" must be read to-
gether with its affirmation of the statutory refusal to allow the exemp-
tion on the basis of "essentially political, sociological or economic con-
siderations" or a "merely personal moral code." 56 In its references to,
Tillich's theology, the Court obviously intends to establish a test which
is not satisfied merely by the subjective importance to an individual
of any given concern, but which requires a certain philosophical depth
in the concern itself, though the nature of this kind of concern may
defy exact description. As Professor Mansfield has pointed out:
Religion cannot be satisfactorily defined merely by reference to the role
that a belief plays in the life of the believer. To some extent the idea
of religion depends on the nature of the questions to which the belief
provides an answer and the fundamental character of the realities that
the believer asserts. 57
Even though the Court was unable to articulate precisely the standard
by which ultimateness can be measured, some claims will fail under
the Seeger test simply because the shallow character of the beliefs on
which they are based will not permit holding them compelled "by rea-
son of religious training or belief." 58 Thus, the Court is not inaccurate
56 United States v. Seeger, 380 US. 163, 173 (1965).
57 Mansfield, Conscientious Objection-1964 Term, 1965 RELIGION & PUBLIC ODER 1,
33-34. Cf. Rabin, When Is a Religious Belief Religious: United States v. Seeger and the
Scope of Free Exercise, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 231, 249 (1966), where the author states:
Seeger offers a necessary guarantee that the individual's system of belief will
be subjected to no value-oriented order of priorities vis-a-vis other systems of
belief. The fact that this viewpoint may be foreign to the "religious" notions
of the founding fathers is irrelevant to a liberal view of the principle which
they established: that every man's moral conceptualization of existential phe-
nomena is entitled to the same respect from state authority.
Seeger does not guarantee, however, that a man can command that respect from state
authority without actually having made some such "moral conceptualization of existen-
tial phenomena." Cf. note 55 supra.
58 See United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846, 852-53 (2d Cir. 1964). This reading
of Seeger, here suggested as preferable in logic as well as result, was anticipatorily
damned by one commentator in the following terms:
Since any attempt by a court to define or interpret the word "religion" in the
first amendment must, of necessity, imply the exclusion of some opinions which
a small minority may choose to call religion, the plain implication . . . is that
any such attempt is automatically unconstitutional... . Any [legislative] defini-
tion would have to include all who "believe", even if that be a "non-belief."
Conklin, supra note 2, at 277.
Seeger appears to modify the effect of United States v. Ballard, 322 U. S. 78 (1944),
at least where section 456(j) is concerned. To Ballard's holding that the truth or falsity
of religious views is not a matter into which a court can inquire, Seeger adds the gloss
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in characterizing its test as "objective;" '9 indeed, the whole purpose
and function of the "ultimateness" test in the Court's opinion is to
establish an objective rather than subjective standard by which objector
claims may be judged. It would violate the sense as well as the intent
of the rule to maintain that the mundane consequences of a belief (i.e.,
objection to war) must be respected when the considerations on which
the belief is ultimately dependent are mundane as well.
In formulating an "ultimate concern" test and emphasizing that "the
statute does not distinguish between externally and internally derived
beliefs," 60 the Court's apparent intention is to suggest that devotion
to an abstract concept which is descriptive of some human quality or
relationship is sufficient to qualify a registrant for conscientious ob-
jector status. Thus, exemption should be granted to a registrant who
is devoted to love, peace, justice, or similar ideals which are moti-
vated from and find their source within the individual but, because
they require for fulfillment an active commitment to the community of
mankind, are not merely personal. Seeger held such a belief-a
"belief in and devotion to goodness and virtue for their own sakes." 61
It is unfortunate that the substance of the Court's standard is obscured
by the opinion's lip service to the statute's "Supreme Being" clause;
Justice Clark takes pains to bring Seeger within the clause by noting
that he did not explicitly disavow a belief in a Supreme Being,°2 and
emphasizing that Congress intended to exclude only "a moral code
that in the context of conscientious objection there may be some views which, however
true they may be and no matter how sincerely held, cannot compel recognition as
"religious."
59 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965).
6old. at 186.
61 ld. at 166. The Court quotes, id. at 183, a statement by a leader of the Ethical
Culture Movement which further illuminates Seeger's kind of nontheistic idealism:
"Instead of positing a personal God, whose existence man can neither prove
nor disprove, the ethical concept is founded on human experience. It is anthro-
pocentric, not theocentric. Religion, for all the various definitions that have
been given of it, must surely mean the devotion of a man to the highest ideal
that he can conceive. And that ideal is a community of spirits in which the
latent moral potentialities of men shall have been elicited by their reciprocal
endeavors to cultivate the best in their fellow men."
D. MuzzE, ETHics AS A RELIGION 95 (1951).
6 Justice Clark observed that Seeger "did not disavow any belief 'in a relation to a
Supreme Being'; indeed, he stated that 'the cosmic order does, perhaps, suggest a
creative intelligence.'" 380 U.S. at 187. The Court's reliance upon this modest affirma-
tion, a sop which a bored but polite heathen might use to pacify a doting missionary,




which is not only personal but which is the sole basis for the regis-
trant's belief and is in no way related to a Supreme Being." 63 This re-
sult amounts to a rule that a scintilla of religion will suffice and, absent
a considerable lack of cooperation from the registrant, a scintilla will
be found."
The elements of the Seeger test are not difficult to express, however
burdensome they may be to apply. The only questions open for the
local draft board are:
1. Is the registrant sincere in his asserted opposition to participation in
war in any form?65
2. Is that opposition essential to his asserted religious faith?66
3. Is the faith he asserts derived from belief in something upon which
all else is ultimately dependent?
Upon examination, the test turns out to repeat faithfully all the princi-
ples of the conscientious objector provisions of the past. But Seeger
departs from prior congressional formulations of those principles, for
it finally abolished any vestige of a requirement of affirmation of be-
lief in an anthropomorphic deity.
This restriction was arguably important as a check on the abuse of
the exemption, and may have been helpful in administering the draft
system. It was clearly regarded by the Court as a distinction among
faiths in terms of their source, prejudicial to those internally derived. It
63 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 186 (1965) (emphasis added).
64Although Justice Clark declared that no question of atheism was presented in
Seeger, id. at 173-74, it has been suggested that
if petitioner were an "atheist" quite the same problems would exist and, in
fact, the answers have been settled by Seeger. The term "atheist" which is in
itself hopelessly vague, is totally irrelevant after Seeger.
Rabin, supra note 57, at 242-43. If this conclusion is correct, it is so for reasons some-
what different from those which seem to underlie the quoted comment. Anyone who
can actually be called an "atheist" must have grappled considerably with "existential
phenomena" or the meaning of life in order to reach such a position; the test of
"ultimateness" would probably be satisfied by the views of such a person. However,
it is hard to imagine how views so derived could compel opposition to participation in
war.
It bears emphasis that the above-discussed implications of the Court's standard in
Seeger are much more compelling in legal theory than in actual practice at the localI
board level. For description of the gap between theory and practice in the operationf
of the Selective Service System, see notes 97-98 infra and accompanying text.
65 See 380 U.S. at 185. The Court refers to the facilities of the Department of Justice
as an aid to local boards in determining sincerity. Under the 1967 amendment to the
Selective Service Act, those facilities'are no longer available. 50 U.S.C. APP. 5 456 (j)
(1967).
66 See 380 U.S. at 184, 186.
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denied to some an exemption to which the demands of their conscience
entitled them, solely for their failure to fall within the arbitrary class
of traditionally recognized theists. However acceptable such a clas-
sification might be in terms of the convenience and conventional wis-
dom of the political majority , the Court condemned it, by implication
too strong honestly to be ignored, as a denial of due process of law.
If the exemption is extended to persons opposed to war by reason of
religious training and belief, then it must be open to all persons who
oppose war by such reason.
The only substantial qualification still imposed on otherwise eligible
religious objectors is that opposition must be to participation in "war
in any form." That restriction was not at issue in Seeger, but the deci-
sion does suggest the considerations which might weigh most heavily
with the Court if it were faced with an attack on the restriction.
"WAR IN ANY FoRvt"
The phrase "war in any form" first appeared among the statutory
criteria for conscientious objector exemptions in the Selective Draft
Act of 1917.67 That Act was more restrictive than any other, before
or since; it confined the exemption to members of "any well-recognized
religious sect or organization... whose existing creed or principles for-
bid its members to participate in war in any form . . . ." 68 The vulner-
ability of the 1917 statute to constitutional attack under present doc-
trines is evident, for the requirement of "peace church" affiliation
patently "constituted a severe restriction of the free exercise of re-
ligion." '9 The same can be said of the requirement of complete
pacifism, whether it is sought to be justified as a test of sincerity, as a
device to facilitate administration of the Selective Service System, or
as a legislative judgment that only complete pacifism can be grounded
in religious training and belief.
No objection is reported to the retention of the "war in any form"
language in the 1940 Act.70 The requirement ironically received its most
influential support from Judge Hand's celebrated dictum in United
States v. Kauten,71 which paved the way for including within the scope
of the exemption persons whose religious views were internally
67 See text at notes 5-6 suspra.
68Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, 40 Stat. 76 (1917).
69 Conklin, supra note 2, at 261.
70 See notes 8, 9 supra.
71133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943). See note 11 supra.
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derived. It is not clear whether Judge Hand was expressing a personal
conviction or merely yielding all ground not necessary to the point he
needed to make when he stated:
There is a distinction between a course of reasoning resulting in a
conviction that a particular war is inexpedient or disastrous and a
conscientious objection to participation in any war under any circum-
stances. The latter, and not the former, may be the basis of exemp-
tion under the Act. The former is usually a political objection .... 72
The first hurdle for a selective objector, therefore, is to demonstrate
that objection to a particular war can in fact be based on religious
training and belief. The Court could not juggle the present statute so
as to include non-pacifist objectors without engaging in the sort of
legerdemain employed in Seeger, and it is fair to suppose that the Court
would not do so absent a clear showing, present in Seeger, that only
by so doing could the constitutionality of the statute be preserved.
It would not suffice to show that nonpacifist objection may be con-
sistent with the statute; a right must be shown which the statute must
be construed to vindicate. The first teaching of Seeger is that if such a
right can be shown, the Court is quite capable of making the statute
conform to it.
The Just War Doctrine: Religion and Selective Objection
Judge Hand's dictum assumes rather than proves that there can be
no constitutional protection for selective objection when he speaks of
"a course of reasoning resulting in a conviction that a particular war
721 d. at 708. Some comfort, in terms of the philosophy of Seeger, can be gleaned
from the word "usually." It has, however, gone generally unnoticed, perhaps on the
theory that when the bath is big and the baby small, they both may be pitched out
together. The view of the Marshall Commission in its 1967 report of the draft was
virtually identical to Judge Hand's, although a contrary minority opinion was pre-
sented and appears in the report as well. The majority, in refusing to recommend
deletion of the complete pacifism restriction, declared its belief
that the status of conscientious objection can properly be applied only to those
who are opposed to all killing of human beings under any circumstances ...
[Tihe majority holds that so-called selective pacifism is essentially a political
question of support or non-support of a war and cannot be judged in terms of
special moral imperatives.
REPoRT OF THE NATIONAL CoMMissioN ON SELinVE SERvCE, IN PURsUIT OF EQUITY:
WHO SERvEs WhEN NoT ALL SERwE? 50 (1967) (hereinafter cited as MARsHALL COM-
MISSION REPORT). The minority view, id. at 48-50, provides a good summary of the
arguments in favor of allowing selective objection.
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is inexpedient or disastrous .... ," Clearly "reasoning" as to what may
be "inexpedient or disastrous" is not a process imbued with religious
values and, to the extent that an objection to a particular war can be
arrived at in only that way, Judge Hand is quite correct in his con-
clusion.
From the traditional and quite orthodox Christian viewpoint, how-
ever, such a position can be compelled by one's faith as well as one's
reason. The "Just War" doctrine, derived in part from the writings of
Augustine 74 and Aquinas,75 provides the Christian with "an explicit
basis for discrimination between justifiable and unjustifiable uses of
force." 76
The Just War doctrine is recognized by most orthodox Christian de-
nominations and can hardly be considered a novel theological con-
cept.77 It is, however, always a surprise to be reminded that a good
Christian, in theory at least, regards all wars as unjust and participates
in some of them only as far as the doctrine permits him to make ex-
ceptions.7 The Selective Service System included in one of its mono-
73 United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1943).
74 ST. AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD XIX, vii.
75 T. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEoLoGIAE, First Part of the Second Part, question 105(3).
76 Potter, supra note 11, at 69. Dr. Potter describes application of the Just War doc-
trine as "a complex process of reasoning, combining fundamental theological beliefs,
theologically derived ethical norms, convictions concerning ultimate loyalties, and
specific empirical input," id. at 67, and asks "[dloes the presence of nontheological
elements, especially the necessary incorporation of factual information concerning spe-
cific political and military events, disqualify an objection based on such reasoning as
being not grounded strictly in 'religious training and belief?"' Id. at 69. His answer is
that "the norms of the Just War are instilled by, and receive their potency from, 'religious
training and belief.'" Id. at 70; cf. note 86 infra and accompanying text.
77 Id. at 66-70. See also R. TUCKER, THE JUST WAR: A STUDY IN CONTEMPORARY
AmrICAN DocTaRNE (1960).
78 In E. LONG, WAR AND CONSCIENCE IN AMERIcA (1968) it is noted that Augustine
himself urged strict obedience to the state as a Christian duty, even where the state's
commands are unjust. The present understanding of the Just War doctrine derives
from the interpretation given it by Francisco de Vitoria, a sixteenth-century Dominican
theologian. De Vitoria maintained that the prince's command does not relieve the
individual from his duty to act according to his conscience, and that no man may fight
in a war he himself believes unjust. Id at 32. This interpretation has been endorsed
recently by the Fourth Assembly of the Vorld Council of Churches. N.Y. Times,
July 17, 1968, at 1, col. 3. The World Council's statement declares in part that
[pirotection of conscience demands that the churches should give spiritual care
and support not only to those serving in armed forces but also to those who,
especially in the light of the nature of modern warfare, object to participation
in particular wars they feel bound in conscience to oppose.
Id. at 10, col. 1.
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graphs the statement that "from the time of Constantine . . . Christi-
anity generally accepted the theory of 'the just war.'" 71 To assure a
Christian registrant that some wars are just could well be to remind
him that other wars may not be. Unless one is prepared to endorse
the theology of Justice Sutherland in Macintosh that as a matter of
law a war declared by Congress is consistent with the will of God,""
the existence of a recognized, if neglected,81 orthodox religious doc-
trine reserving the right of distinction to the individual believer de-
feats the conventional, unexamined assumption that objection to a par-
ticular war is a fortiori a political stance.8 2
The selective objector's real difficulty in gaining acceptance of his
position is clarifying the "religiousness" of the context in which his
judgments may be made. While Daniel Seeger did not think about
the policies of a particular war because he was against all war, the
selective objector is required to consider political facts in reaching his
decision. A "just war" is one which meets all of a number of require-
ments,ss those generally agreed upon being the following:
1. All peaceful means of resolving the conflict must have been ex-
hausted before recourse is had to war.
2. The war must be formally declared by legitimate authority.
'9 SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, SPECIAL MONOGRAPH No. 11, 1 CoNSCIErNous OBJECTION
8 (1950).
80 See note 43 supra.
8J Potter, supra note 76, at 74-77. The churches have neglected the doctrine, according
to Dr. Potter, because as war has come to be seen as an all-or-nothing affair, pacifism
has come to be thought of as an all-or-nothing decision.
The shadow of the nuclear bomb kept the just war doctrine in eclipse. Fine
distinctions seemed "irrelevant" in a time of anticipated apocalypse. But under
the nuclear umbrella lesser wars are being fought, wars in which decisions con-
cerning permissible means bear heavily upon individuals at every rank....
Id. at 75-76.
82The Marshall Commission considered the Just War doctrine and decided that
since it would be interpreted in different ways by different denominations it was
"therefore not a matter upon which the Commission could pass judgment." MARSHALL
COMMISSION REPORT 50. It does not necessarily follow that because an admittedly
religious doctrine is not uniform among sects it is therefore not religious, but the Com-
mission's holding that "so-called selective pacifism . . . cannot be judged in terms of
special moral imperatives," id., suggests it so concluded.
8 3 t may have been the lack of consensus as to the number of requirements which
made the Marshall Commision decline seriously to consider the doctrine. E. LONG,
supra note 75, gives six; seven are listed in Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, United
States v. Spiro, 384 F.2d 159 (3d Cit. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968); and a
short article in Tim NEw REPuBLic, July 1, 1967, at 15, summarizing the Augustinian
formulation, lists four. The tenor and substance of the requirements are uniform,
however, whether or not there is agreement on their exact number.
1374
1968] Selective Conscientious Objection 1375
3. The war must be in defense of a "morally preferable cause against
threats of destruction or the rise of injustice." 84
4. There must be reasonable assurance of success.
5. There must be, in the war as a whole and with respect to any act
within the war, a balance in which the good outveighs the evil.
6. The means of warfare must be legitimate: there must be no in-
discriminate killing of noncombatants.85
84 E. LONG, supra note 78, at 24.
85 The doctrine has been raised as a defense to a prosecution for failure to submit
to induction only once to date, in United States v. Spiro, 384 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968). Stephen Spiro was a Roman Catholic who had
received a I-A-O classification (noncombatant military service) from his draft board;
he appealed seeking a 1-0 classification (civilian alternative service). After an F.B.I.
investigation and a hearing by a Justice Department Hearing Officer, his file was
returned to the local board with a negative recommendation, and the local board
classified him I-A. A week later the board sent Spiro an induction order, but Spiro
refused to submit to induction.
His defense was his adherence to the Just War doctrine as a traditional teaching of
the Roman Catholic Church; apart from his attendance at a military high school, ad-
mittedly some years before he had heard of the doctrine, there appeared no reason to
question his good faith in his professions, nor of his familiarity with the doctrine itself.
Spiro was not a selective objector, however, because he maintained that "there had
never been a just war in history and there never could be." Id., Petitioner's Brief for
Certiorari at 8a-9a. The fact that Spiro could theoretically participate in war, though
he claimed for practical purposes to be a total pacifist, was held grounds for the local
board's classification and induction order. The Third Circuit affirmed, in an un-
reported opinion which does not discuss Spiro's Just War doctrine claim, and the Su-
preme Court denied certiorari, Justices Black and Douglas dissenting.
Spiro's case is interesting less as the only judicial treatment (or non-treatment) of the
Just War doctrine, or as a selective objection case, than as it relates to a line of prior
cases dealing with Jehovah's Witnesses, totally inconsistent with the result in Spiro.
The Jehovah's Witnesses cases are of doubtful applicability to the selective objection
problem, but they have been relied on extensively in at least one case of selective ob-
jection. Noyd v. McNamara, 378 F.2d 538 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1022
(1967). They represent one line of attack on the "war in any form" language of
section 456 (j).
Jehovah's Witnesses are not permitted to serve in the army of a mere political state,
but they are prepared to wage a holy war for their faith, for "Kingdom interests."
The Government contended in several cases that "war in any form" means what it
says and Witnesses could not, therefore, meet the statutory requirement of complete
pacifism. But in Taffs v. United States, 208 F.2d 329, 331 (8th Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 928 (1954), it was held that
[Congress] intended by this section to exempt those persons from serving in the
armed forces whose religious beliefs were opposed to any form of participation
in a flesh and blood war between nations.
Judge Medina, in United States v. Hartman, 209 F.2d 366 (2d Cir. 1954), relied on
Tut's for the proposition that, since there is only one form of war, "in any form" must
modify "participation," thus disposing of the Government's claim that Congress meant
to include theocratic wars within the statute. Id. at 371.
The question was laid to rest by the Supreme Court in Sicurella v. United States,
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Application of these requirements to any particular war necessarily
involves the weighing of political facts which the state itself has already
considered. Therefore, it is not surprising that opposition to such a war
derived from that application might be regarded as political rather than
religious in character, and a threat to good order. Although the selec-
tive objector may have applied religious criteria to political facts, the
context in which he makes his decision is not readily apparent; the
practical political consequences of his decision, however, are obvious.
The fact situation in Seeger presented this kind of difficulty. The
Government argued that Seeger's beliefs were too strongly tainted by
reason and temporal considerations to merit consideration as "reli-
gious." 86 The Court held, however, that a moral code is beyond the
scope of "religious training and belief" only if it is both personal and
the sole basis for the asserted belief.8 7 This holding applies with peculiar
force to claims of selective conscientious objection. It must be granted
that there is a Just War doctrine, that the doctrine is a part of the
teachings of admittedly religious denominations, and that the doctrine
requires believers to pass judgment on a war before participating in it.
348 U.S. 385 (1955). Sicurella stated he would fight for Kingdom interests, in support
of his brethren and in defense of'his property, but not in carnal wars. Justice Clark
wrote for the Court that
[tihe test is not whether the registrant is opposed to all war, but whether he is
opposed, on religious grounds, to participation in war. As to theocratic war,
petitioner's willingness to fight on the orders of Jehovah is tempered by the fact
that . . . their history records no such command since Biblical times ....
Id. at 390-91. Justice Minton asserted in dissent that the majority opinion left
Sicurella "the right to choose the wars in which he will fight," id. at 395, and his state-
ment has been cited as proof of the truth of its assertion.
In granting the exemption, the Court did not find that the statutory "war in any form"
qualification was satisfied by a state of facts in which Jehovah might order Sicurella to
fight in some terrestrial wars but not in others. It is clear that the holding rests on
the assumption that there will be no divine commands at all. The Court holds, in effect,
that Jehovah and Congress wage different kinds of war. Even if it were possible, in
the abstract, that their wars might be of the same sort, Congress has made several
formal declarations of war in under 200 years, while Jehovah has declared none in
several millennia. Therefore the Court will not take His reserved power to do so into
account in deciding cases. No very compelling argument can be made for selective ob-
jection from this material, but it is quite clear that Spiro, under the Court's reasoning
in Sicurella, had a better claim to the exemption than the Jehovah's Witnesses.
86 The Government's argument has been characterized as betraying
a naive, fundamentalist attitude . . . toward the relation between religious truth
and the formulation of moral judgments. [It seems] to suggest that if the in-
tellect and reasoning have a hand in the matter, the conclusion reached cannot
really be considered a religiously founded one.
Mansfield, supra note 57, at 18-19.
87 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 186 (1965).
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It follows that if a member of one of those denominations actually does
apply the doctrine to a particular war and finds he cannot participate
in it, his claim as a selective objector would have a religious basis. The
fact that temporal considerations figured in the decision upon which
his claim is based does not negate the religious character of that de-
cision, nor that of the opposition itself as an exercise of his religion.
No matter how many political factors he may have weighed, and no
matter how personal some of his judgments may have been, his as-
serted belief and claim do not rest solely on non-religious considera-
tions. If this is true for a selective objector who belongs to a denomi-
nation which recognizes the Just War doctrine, it must be true as
well for the selective objector whose religious scruples may be in-
formal, individual, and recognizable only to Tillich or the Supreme
Court.88
Selective Objection and Equal Protection
If two registrants claim exemption and both of them demonstrate
sincerity in an opposition which represents a meaningful part of a
value system fundamental in character, both of their claims, under
Seeger, are based on "religious training and belief." If one of them,
however, asks only for exemption from participation in a particular
war, his claim will be denied under present law, while the other will
be granted. If it is conceded that a selective objector may be religiously
motivated, then the "in any form" statutory classification is just as
discriminatory in its effect upon the selective objector's exercise of his
religion as the Supreme Being requirement was upon Seeger's exercise
of his nontheistic faith. If an exemption is extended to persons opposed
to participation in war because of religious belief, it cannot constitu-
tionally be denied those whose religious beliefs compel them to oppose
participation in some wars only. 9
If a selective objector were to attempt to force his inclusion within
the existing statutory exemption, he would have to demonstrate that
the classification restricting the exemption to total pacifists denies him
the equal protection of the law to such an extent that it constitutes a
88 Denominational preference in granting the exemption would violate the establish-
ment clause. See Justice Black's statement, quoted supra note 33.
89The issue at this point is merely the constitutionally required scope of whatever
exemption Congress chooses to provide, not whether any exemption is constitutionally
compelled. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958). See generally Note, Uncon-
stitutional Conditions, 73 HAiv. L. REv. 1595 (1960).
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deprivation of his liberty without due process of law. Ordinarily the
underinclusiveness of such a classification could be defended success-
fully by showing its rational relation to a substantial governmental
interest;90 in this instance that interest would be the integrity and ad-
ministrative feasibility of the Selective Service System, an interest which
the Court has found to be "vital" and "substantial." "' In the area of
conscientious objection, however, the selective objector is allegedly
deprived of a religious liberty by the classification. Therefore, demon-
strated underinclusiveness establishes infringement not only of due
process but also of the right to the free exercise of religion. The equal
protection argument, then, must be fought on first amendment grounds,
and the burden placed upon the Government to justify the retention
of the "in any form" classification is considerably greater than it
would be if religion were not involved. The extent of that burden was
spelled out by the Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner:
It is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to some
colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitu-
tional area, "[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount in-
terests, give occasion for permissible limitation." . . . [I]t would
plainly be incumbent upon the [state] to demonstrate that no al-
ternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses without in-
fringing First Amendment rights.92
The classification presently imposed by the "in any form" require-
ment has the same function as the "Supreme Being" clause construed
out of the statute in Seeger. Both phrases are obviously inadequate as
descriptions of religion, and were intended rather to safeguard the ad-
ministrative feasibility of the Selective Service System. In Seeger the
Government argued that, while to grant no exemption at all would be
"calloused interference with religious liberty," 93 wholesale exemption
of nontheists would "undermine confidence in the concept of universal
service." 94 The crux of the Government's argument was not that
nontheists were insincere or irreligious, but that if the Supreme Being
limitation were eliminated, so many people would obtain exemptions
90 See generally Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAXMF.
L. REv. 341 (1949).
91 See note 95 infra.
92 374 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1963).
9 3 Reply Brief for the United States at 14, United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
94 Id. at 80.
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that the concept of universal service and the conscription system itself
would be undermined.
Nothing in the Seeger opinion indicates whether the Court rejected
this in terrorem approach because it did not believe it or because it
did not greatly care about the Selective Service System 5 The Court's
sedulous avoidance of any imputation to Congress of an intent to pick
and choose among religions-in the face of the Government's conten-
tion that Congress felt obliged to do exactly that-suggests that, no
matter how much respect the Court has for the Selective Service Sys-
tem, it will not permit an infringement of religious freedom to save
the System without the most compelling demonstration that the Sys-
tem can only thus be saved. There is no reason to believe, therefore,
that the requirements of Sherbert v. Verner are to be relaxed in a
conscientious objection case.
In Seeger the Government argued in terrorem on principle alone; if
95 In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the Court reversed a decision in
the First Circuit that a conviction for draft-card burning under the 1965 amendment
to section 462 of the draft law violated freedom of speech protected by the first
amendment. Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court, declared that even assuming
arguendo that O'Brien's conduct could be brought within the scope of the first
amendment, "it does not necessarily follow that the destruction of a registration
certificate is constitutionally protected activity." Id. at 376. The Government had
contended that penalties for such destruction were required to deter actions which would
substantially interfere with the administration of the Selective Service System. The
Chief Justice went on to characterize the test which such an asserted state interest
would have to meet to override a claim like O'Brien's, id. at 377, in terms reminiscent
of Sherbert v'. Verner, though noticeably less strong:
[W]e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important
or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on al-
leged First Amendment freedom is no greater than is essential to the further-
ance of that interest.
O'Brien's asserted constitutional right was a penumbral one, while free exercise of
religion is expressly granted by the first amendment. It does not appear from the Chief
Justice's opinion whether a less exiguous claim under the religion clauses of the first
amendment would result in the application of more stringent criteria to an asserted
countervailing government interest. Where that interest is the smooth functioning
of the Selective Service System, however, the O'Brien opinion is instructive. Finding
that Congress' power to "raise and support armies and to make all laws necessary and
proper to that end is broad and sweeping," id. at 377, the Chief Justice wrote that
the Nation has a vital interest in having a system for raising armies that func-
tions with maximum efficiency and is capable of easily and quickly responding
to continually changing circumstances. For these reasons, the Government has a




it seeks to justify "in any form" on the same grounds, it will have to,
clothe its principle in facts sufficient to show that the terror is realY&
It must demonstrate that "in any form" is an objective test of sincerity,
the last filtering device left in the system, without which so many
claimants would succeed that the system would be destroyed.
It is not certain that enough facts can be found for the purpose. A
study of a number of draft boards in the Chicago area made after
Seeger indicates that sincerity is not determined by any objective tests,
no matter what the words of the statute provide, and that Seeger has
had no impact on whatever subjective criteria are appliedY7 The study
concluded that "Seeger simply cannot be lived with at the local board
level. Partly because of lack of competence and partly because of hos-
tility, the case is ignored." 1s It does not seem, then, that statutory
96 It is possible that the Court was not terrified by this argument because of con-
fidence that the Justice Department assistance available to appeal boards guaranteed a
sufficiently exact determination of sincerity. However, the 1967 revision of the Act,
50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1967), eliminated this comprehensive scheme, and draft boards
now will have nothing to work with save what the registrant puts on the record. If
the Seeger Court held as it did in reliance on such procedural backstops to control the
swarm of claimants which the Government suggested would descend upon elimination
of the Supreme Being restriction, then it might be reluctant now to dispense with the
hypothetical safeguards afforded by "in any form."
97 Rabin, Do You Believe in a Supreme Being-The Administration of the Conscientious
Objector Exemption, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 642, 671, 679. It should be noted that this study
was made before the 1967 revision, discussed supra note 96.
98 Id. at 671. One registrant, whose religious views were similar to Seeger's, encountered
skepticism from the head of his local board and asked if the chairman had ever heard
of the Seeger case. The chairman replied that he had and, so far as he knew, "Siebert"
was still in jail. Id. at 666.
The problems facing the conscientious objector at the local board level have been
succinctly summarized by Marvin Karpatkin, Esq., an attorney who has handled
numerous objector claims including the case of Captain Dale Noyd, note 120 infra:
Those of us who practice in the field find an astonishing ignorance and hos-
tility, on the part of many local boards and on the part of some Selective Service
administrators, to the requirement that all conscientious objectors be recognized
as directed by the Seeger decision. . . . The ambiguities of Form 150, the ab-
sence of proper and informative direction to local board members and the total
lack of due process impose continuing pressure upon registrants and their at-
torneys to make their views sound as traditional as possible, in order to qualify.
Rarely indeed does a Selective Service registrant with Seeger-lke views have
a fair opportunity for reasoned dialogue concerning his views and his claim
with any Selective Service official having decision-making powers. Now that the
Department of Justice hearings have been eliminated, the only face-to-face con-
frontation which a claimant has is with his local board-assuming that he is not
trapped into a no-reopening situation where he never even gets any hearing.
At the local board he is denied counsel by explicit prohibition of regulations
and may have witnesses only at the board's discretion. No transcript is kept and
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criteria of an ostensibly objective character have a great deal of effect
on the determination of sincerity. While it would be comforting to sup-
pose that a sound and nondiscriminatory test, if one could be found,
might help local boards, clearly the elimination of an unsound and
discriminatory test will not hinder them.
Most damaging to any effort by the Government to preserve "in any
form" as the last defense against a flood of exemptions, even assuming
arguendo that proof of an impending deluge would suffice to retain
the pacifist requirement, is the lack of effect of Seeger on the number
of exemptions granted. The Selective Service System does not have
records of the number of conscientious objector claims made at the
local board level, but it does keep figures on the number of exemptions
finally granted. There was no perceptible increase in that number in
the thirteen months following Seeger.99 Furthermore, only 20,200 out
of 32,640,000 registrants are classified as conscientious objectors, 0.065
percent of the total.10  What weight these data should be given is not
certain, but they do suggest that the present number of recognized
exemptions could be multiplied several times before either the Selec-
tive Service System or the national defense would be jeopardized. 01
there is little way that he can protect against an erroneous or biased entry in
the minutes of board action on his claim. The board's determinations are then
subject to only the narrowest "any rational basis in fact" judicial review. There is
no appearance of any kind permitted-by either registrant, counsel or witnesses
-before the appeal boards, and there are no opinions issued or explanations of
any kind accompanying appeal board action; also there is reason to believe that
some appeal boards do not even meet to deliberate on each case, but simply
pass the papers around.
Memorandum from Marvin Karpatkin, Esq., Oct. 14, 1968, on file in the offices of
the Virginia Law Review. The hostility of local boards is further illustrated by the
Marshall Commission's finding that in one state fifty-five percent of all local board
members thought that conscientious objectors should not be deferred at all. MARSHALL
CoMmiIssioN REPORT 108-09 (1967).
99 Comment, The Conscientious Objector and the First Amendment: There But For
The Grace of God . . , 34 U. CHL L. REv. 79, 89 n.49 (1966), citing letter from
Kenneth H. McGill, Chief of the Research and Statistics Division, Selective Service
System, April 6, 1966.
100 1 d. at 88 n.46.
101 In Hochstadt, The Right to Exemption From Military Service of a Conscientious
Objector to a Particular War, 3 HARv. Civ. Lm.-Civ. RIGHrs L. REv. 1 (1967), it is cal-
culated from figures in the Marshall Commission Report that the manpower lost to
the military through exemptions and claims under section 456(j) as of September, 1966,
was at most 0.15% of the total registered, hardly an ominous statistic.
The British experience in World War II has been regarded as evidence that both
the system and the nation would survive abandonment of all tests of sincerity. The
British statute imposed neither tests of religion nor of pacifism; a registrant needed only
to be conscientiously opposed to military service. A system of review boards, employing
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Elimination of the "Supreme Being" restrictive classification in Seeger
resulted in no such multiplication, and it is not likely that the Gov-
erament could show that the number of exemptions resulting from
elimination of "in any form" would constitute a "grave abuse, endanger-
ing a paramount interest." There is even less reason to suppose that
the Government could meet the additional requirement of Sherbert v.
Verner-a showing that any alternative form of regulation, such as per-
mitting selective objectors to try to prove their claims, would endanger
the Selective Service System.0 2 The requirement that only complete
pacifists are eligible for a conscientious objector exemption is therefore
not an administrative necessity, but rather an arbitrary device to con-
trol the number of exemptions granted without regard to the sincerity
of those who claim exemption. Such a classification is constitutionally
infirm, and only extremely convincing proof that it is necessary to the
preservation of the conscription system should immunize it from at-
tack. Such proof does not appear to exist. If the Government wishes
to save the restrictive classification, it will have to develop other argu-
ments for the purpose.
One possible approach, closely related to the administrative neces-
sity argument, is to contend that, even if the recognition of a right to
selective objection would not of itself flood the system, the door, once
opened to admit the selective objector, could not then be closed on
anyone else. While this more subtle in terrorem defense should not be
entertained without first putting the Government to a showing of the
judicial procedures, was established to hear claims and to classify registrants for non-
combatant duty, civilian alternative service, or for unconditional exemption-a category
not presently provided in this country. Over 60,000 claims were made, 43,000 of which
were granted, or about 0.5% of a total registration of 8,123,000. See D. HAYES, THE
CHALLENGE OF CoNscIENC 382-83 (1949); see generally J. CoRNu-c, Tan CoNsciENnous
OBJEC OR AND THE LAw 119-138 (1943); M. SIBLEY & P. JACOB, CONSCMRITON OF CON-
SCIENCE 2-7 (1952).
The differences between the nature of the threat faced by the United Kingdom in
World War I and that faced by the United States in 1968, and the popular responses
thereto, make any conclusions based on an extrapolation from the United Kingdom
statistics extremely hazardous. The British system may be of more interest for its
procedures than for its results. Rabin, supra note 97, compares the system with the
present American one, and believes the most important difference to be the complete
separation in the United Kingdom of the machinery of conscription from that of
exemption. The American system gives authority to exempt to the very functionaries
who are obliged to meet quota requirements; it is not surprising that some conflict
of interest results.
1o For a selection of proposed alternatives to conscription, see Tan DRAFT (S. Tax




nature and number of the additional classes of possible claimants whose
exemption, it is feared, would destroy the system, the argument lacks
merit even if such a showing were made. Once Congress has chosen
to draw a line between the extremes of no exemption and uncontrolled
exemption, those who attack the congressional classification need only
show that it is improper or irrational with respect to themselves. If
the Court, in cases involving due process and equal protection for juve-
nilesl03 and for indigents in criminal appeals,'0 4 has not been obliged to
say how extensive such persons' rights ultimately may be in holding
that they are greater than formerly was recognized, a selective objector
should not be compelled to show how far Congress must extend the
exemption to assert that Congress should have gone farther than it
did.105 If the exemption is really designed to protect those citizens who
otherwise would be confronted with a choice between imprisonment
and violation of paramount religious beliefs, subject only to the abso-
lutely unavoidable limitations imposed by administrative necessity, then
a selective objector need only show that he is faced with that choice
and that the restriction in the statute which forces the choice upon him
is not administratively necessary.
The Marshall Commission Report
In its 1967 Report on the draft, 06 the Marshall Commission insisted
that selective objection was necessarily mere political opposition and
refused to consider the Just War doctrine. 0 7 The Commission also
reported that "legal recognition of selective pacifism could open the
doors to a general theory of selective disobedience to law," and per-
ceived but dim distinction between conscientious opposition to partici-
pation in a particular war and conscientious refusal to pay a particular
tax.108 The Commission ignored a fundamental difference between the
two kinds of protest. On the one hand, under the present tax system,
governmental acquiescence in an individual's refusal to support an ob-
jectionable program or activity would create insuperable administrative
problems. 09 In the absence of a feasible alternative to the present svs-
i03 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
04See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
0 5 See generally Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 90.
'
0 6 See note 72 supra.
107 Id.
108 LARSHALL COMMISSION REPORT 50 (1967); cf. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Non-
establishment, and Doctrinal Development, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1381, 1409 (1967).
109When an individual withholds all or part of his tax in conscientious protest
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tem of universal income taxation as a means of collecting the general
revenue, an individual's payment of taxes may be compelled. Refusal
to participate in a particular war, on the other hand, entails no com-
parable administrative problems in effectuating the conscientious ob-
jection, and alternative routes exist by which the individual can fulfill
his personal service obligation. One proposal considered by the Com-
mission stipulated that a selective objector could be assigned noncom-
batant duty or civilian alternative service, as is provided in the present
law for exempted pacifist objectors.110 The Commission did not ob-
ject to the administrative feasibility of this proposal, but was "un-
able to see the morality" of allowing a nonpacifist to avoid combatant
service in an "unjust" war under these provisions."' The inability
must stem from refusal to consider religion as a possible motivation for
selective objection, as no distinction can be drawn between alternative
or noncombatant service performed by a religious pacifist and the
same service performed by a religious nonpacifist.
The Commission was also concerned about the effect of selective
pacifism on the morale and effectiveness of the armed forces. 112 It felt
that a determination of the justness or unjustness of a particular war
could be made only by one actually participating in it, and that the
sudden conscientious withdrawal from the war of troops already in
combat would involve great risks to everyone." 3 The Commission's
inference is unimpeachable, but its premise is open to doubt. If such
an exemption were allowed at all, it would probably be claimed upon
registration or by subsequent application to a local board, like the
vast majority of pacifist exemptions. Those claimed after induction
would clearly be liable to stricter control, as are pacifist claims made
by men already in uniform. Furthermore, it would be surprising if
foxholes were found to be a breeding ground for pacifism, any more
than they are said to be for atheism. In any event, it is no argument
against allowing an exemption for selective objectors to say that in
against a certain government activity, there is no administratively feasible way to pass
on the particular diminution in revenue to the particular activity objected to. The
diminution, as well as any tax paid, will be passed on proportionately to all governmental
operations, so that an individual withholding part of his tax will still be supporting the
objectionable activity, and on withholding part or all of his tax will fail to carry his
share of those government expenses to which he does not object. The nature of the
tax system prevents effective refusal to support only a particular activity.
11050 U.S.C. APP. 454 (1967); 32 C.F.R. §§ 1622.11, 1622.14 (1968).
111 MARSHALL COMMISSION REPORT 50 (1967).
112 Cf. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929).
113 MARSHALL COMMISSION REPORT 50-51 (1967).
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some circumstances, predictable and subject to administrative control,
such an exemption might not be feasible.
A recent comment on dissent to the war in Vietnam suggests that it
may be impossible to make a truly conscientious selective objector fight
at all in a war he considers unjust,"14 a practical consideration Congress
may have had in mind when it created the original exemption for
pacifist sectarians."115 In light of this consideration, the Commission's
concern is better met by exempting selective objectors long before they
reach the battle zone that by denying them the exemption altogether. 1 6
CONSTITUTIONAL CROSSFIRE
The selective objector's right to an exemption has been asserted in
only two cases to date, United States v. Kurki"17 and Noyd v. McNa-
mnara," 8 with inconclusive results. Kurki's selective objection claim was
discussed only by the district court; his appeal was disposed of on
other grounds altogether. 1 9 In Noyd an Air Force captain on active
114 THE NEw REPUBLIc, Jan. 6, 1968, at 23-26.
115 See Mansfield, supra note 57, at 41.
116The Commission added a further consideration which led it to reject the con-
cept of selective objection based on the Just War doctrine:
Forcing upon the individual the necessity of making that distinction-which
would be the practical effect of taking away the Government's obligation of
making it for him-could put a burden heretofore unknown on the man in uni-
form and even on the brink of combat ...
MAisRALL CommsSIoN REPORT 50-51 (1967). The Commission's solicitude requires no
comment.
117384 F.2d 905 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 926 (1968).
118 378 F.2d 538 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1022 (1967).
119 Kurki registered for the draft before the Seeger decision; not believing himself
legally qualified for an exemption, he did not sign the conscientious objector declara-
tion on the registration form. Neither did he appeal his local board's decision to
classify him I-A. His conscientious objector claim was raised for the first time in a
motion to dismiss an indictment brought against him for failure to report for induc-
tion. At that time he submitted an affidavit stating that as he did not believe in a
Supreme Being and did not oppose all wars he had not thought himself eligible for
exemption until after he heard of the Seeger decisions. His motion to dismiss was
based on a claim of excusable neglect, couched in terms taken from Seeger. The
motion itself was dismissed, the court holding in part that
in attempting to place himself within the Seeger test ... as to the meaning of the
phrase "religious training and belief" . . . he asks the court to place a new
interpretation on that portion of the same statute which requires a conscientious
opposition to war in any form. In effect, Kurki urges this court to adopt ...
a "particular war" test.... The court has carefully scrutinized the Seeger case
and finds absolutely no authority for such a test.
This court cannot adopt such a test which flies in the face of the language
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-duty sought reclassification through Air Force channels, was denied it,
and subsequently refused to obey a lawful order to train pilots en route
to Vietnam. °20 But if a selective objection case devoid of such compli-
cations reaches the Supreme Court in which a religious basis for objec-
tion is adequately demonstrated, it is submitted that, under Seeger, the
Court will have to countenance an infringement of religious liberty or
eliminate the "war in any form" limitation by either statutory interpreta-
tion or a direct constitutional holding.
The discreet methodology employed in Seeger implies, among other
things, a desire on the part of the Court to avoid a constitutional in-
terpretation of the conscientious objector provision of the draft law.
It is possible, as some commentators have suggested," 1 that the Court
treads gingerly in this area in fear that Congress might repeal the ex-
emption altogether if its scope were extended too far by the judiciary.
The Court might then find itself unable to compel Congress to rein-
state the exemption on constitutional grounds. This possibility is the
greatest threat to any recognition at law of a right to selective ob-
jection, and the status of such objection cannot be asserted without
considering the validity and implications of that threat.
Background of the Legislative Grace Theory of Exemption
There is some consensus among commentators that an exemption for
of 50 U.S.C.A. App. S 456(j) and defies the intent of Congress when it set up
the conditions for the conscientious objector exemption.
255 F. Supp. 161, 165 (E.D. Wisc. 1966).
Evidently Kurld did not feel any effort beyond the mere statement of his claim
was required to place himself within the scope of Seeger, as he offered no additional
constitutional arguments in support of that claim.
120 378 F.2d 538 (10th Cir. 1967). Noyd's attempts in civilian courts to compel Air
Force recognition of his status as a selective objector were dismissed for lack of juris-
diction, because he had not exhausted all possible remedies within the military estab-
lishment. The Supreme Court denied certiorari, 389 U.S. 1022 (1967), and Noyd
was convicted by a general court martial for refusing to obey a lawful order to train a
student pilot on orders to Vietnam.
The procedural differences between selective service classification of civilians and
military re-classification of personnel on active duty, and the additional complication
of Noyd's refusal to obey an order, will probably provide adequate grounds for a final
disposition of his case without ever reaching the merits of his selective objector claim.
See Comment, God, The Army, and Judicial Review: The In-Service Conscientious
Objector, 56 CALim. L. Rxv. 379, 393-95 (1968). Appeal is being taken from the court
martial's verdict, however, and it is remotely possible that Noyd's case will afford
the Supreme Court a vehicle for passing on selective objection if it chooses to do so.
121 See note 37 supra.
Selective Conscientious Objection
conscientious objectors is not constitutionally compelled, 122 although
it has been suggested that the status of the exemption should be re-
examined in the light of recent decisions by the Court in the first
amendment area. 23 In any event, the theory that conscientious objector
exemptions are a matter of legislative grace finds support as early as
the congressional debates over the Bill of Rights, when a proposed
clause exempting "those religiously scrupulous" from the bearing of
arms was omitted from the finished amendment. 124
The first judicial language on the subject appears in Jacobson v. Mas-
sachusetts, decided in 1905. 12 The issue there was whether Jacobson
could be required to submit to vaccination despite religious scruples;
the first Justice Harlan wrote that he could be, adding that a person
could also be compelled to go to war in defense of his country, re-
gardless of his religious convictions.' 26 The statement is dictum, but it
has been durable.
In United States v. Macintosh, in which Chief Justice Hughes wrote
the dissent discussed above, 12 7 the decision turned on the intended
meaning of the oath of allegiance required of naturalized citizens. Mac-
intosh stipulated that his allegiance to the United States was subordi-
nate to his allegiance to God and that he could not swear he would
necessarily defend the United States against all its enemies. Justice
Sutherland condemned the suggestion that the Constitution reserved
such a prerogative to Macintosh or to anyone else. He stated that
122 One analysis of the cases concludes,
We may therefore accept as the law today that both Congress and the states
have the constitutional power to compel all to engage in armed combat, ir-
respective of individual religious contrary convictions; and to impose for re-
fusal such lesser sanctions as exclusion from citizenship, public controlled
educational institutions, and the practice of the law.
L. PFErFR, CHURCH, STATE AND FRzEMOM 621 (rev. ed. 1967).
123 See, e.g., Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the United States: A Turning Point?,
1966 Wis. L. REv. 217; Comment, The Conscientious Objector and the First Amend-
ment: There But For The Grace of God . .. , 34 U. Cmi. L. Rzv. 79 (1966).
124 The surviving part of the record of the debate gives the opinion of one repre-
sentative that "he would always leave it to the benevolence of the Legislature, for,
modify it as you please, it will be impossible to express it in such a manner as to
clear it of ambiguity." It is not known whether this prescient concern was the
reason for the failure of the clause to appear in the finished amendment, but the fact
that it was for some reason omitted is taken to show that the framers intended no
constitutional mandate for the exemption. Mansfield, supra note 57, at 59-60, quoting
I ANNmALS OF CONGRESS 751 (1789).
125 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
126 Id. at 29.
127283 U.S. 605 (1931). See text at notes 43-44 supra.
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"[t]he privilege of the native-born conscientious objector to avoid bear-
ing arms comes not from the Constitution, but from the acts of Con-
gress." 128
Determination of the merits of Macintosh's claim did not require ex-
position of the Constitution. But however gratuitous Justice Suther-
land's dictum may have been, it was taken as dispositive in Hamilton
v. Regents,129 where students at the University of California challenged
the state's power to compel their participation in ROTC programs as a
condition of attending the state university. The Court relied on Mac-
intosh for the principle that the students had no constitutional right
to avoid the bearing of arms, and held that since attendance at the state
university itself was not compulsory, the students had to observe the
university's curriculum requirements or go elsewhere. The holding de-
pended in large part upon the fact that no pledge to engage in actual
military service was involved in taking the required ROTC course,
and this element considerably limits the effect of the case.
The most recent case in the Macintosh line is In re Summers,2 0 where
the Court upheld the Illinois Bar Association's refusal to admit a
pacifist. Summers was obliged to swear to defend the Illinois constitu-
tion, which required militia service in time of war and provided no
exemptions from that service. The Illinois supreme court held that
Summers' pacifist convictions made it impossible for him to swear the
oath and that consequently he could not be admitted to the bar. This
ruling was upheld in a five-four decision by the Supreme Court which,
again relying heavily on Macintosh, found that such an exclusion
worked no deprivation of constitutionally guaranteed religious liberty.
Summers is the only case in this line whose holding is squarely based
on constitutional interpretation, and it would seem controlling on that
account. However, the Court relied heavily upon Macintosh in decid-
ing as it did, and in 1946 Macintosh was overruled. Macintosh had been
ostensibly a case of statutory interpretation; in Girouard v. United
States13 the Court re-interpreted the same statute and concluded that
Congress had not intended to exclude conscientious objectors from
naturalized citizenship. The Girouard Court did not address the ques-
tion of whether Congress could have done so, as Macintosh has been
128 Id. at 624.
129 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
130 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
131 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
[Vol. 54:13551388
Selective Conscientious Objection
held to establish, but Girouard also contains dicta which contradict
those of Macintosh as squarely as its holding reverses the earlier case.132
It is a safe operating premise, then, that Macintosh is not good law,
and the holding in Hamilton, narrow to begin with, is weak as well
to the extent it depends on the constitutional dicta of Macintosh. Sum-
mers, however, is not so easily wished away. Though weakened by the
staleness of Macintosh, it is not dead as precedent. On the other hand,
Professor Mansfield has written that even if Summers were unimpaired
it could be read merely as a statement that in some circumstances
Congress can compel combatant service under the war power-a state-
ment quite different than a holding that Congress can do so at its
pleasure, in time of peace, and in disregard of the conscientious scruples
of those it would punish for disobedience.233
In any event, the most that can be said for the Macintosh-Summers
line of cases is that it lends support to the proposition that there may
not be an absolute right to avoid the bearing of arms, but does not estab-
lish that proposition. The least that can be said for the cases is that
they are not only stale and inconclusive in themselves but also ir-
relevant in the light of more recent decisions construing the religion
clauses of the first amendment.
Constitutional Compulsion of the Exemption
While an exemption for some conscientious objectors exists, the
problem for a religiously motivated selective objector is one of obtain-
ing protection for his religious scruples equal to the protection the
statute gives those of pacifist objectors. If the exemption were with-
drawn altogether, however, religious pacifist objectors would also be
affected and an effort to find a constitutional mandate for their exemp-
tion would be based on the free exercise clause alone.
Cantwell v. Connecticut 34 offers the classic statement of the doctrinal
limitation on free exercise: while it is absolutely beyond the authority
of the state to limit or control freedom of belief, freedom to act on
that belief is necessarily subject to regulation for the protection of
society. The same doctrine was applied by Chief Justice Waite in
132 E.g., id. at 68, where Justice Douglas' language echoes the Macintosh dissent:
Throughout the ages, men have suffered death rather than subordinate their al-
legiance to God to the authority of the State. Freedom of religion guaranteed
by the First Amendment is the product of that struggle.
133 Mansfield, supra note 57, at 66.
134 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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Reynolds v. United States,13  where a Mormon defended polygamy as
an exercise of his religion. The Court did not concede a religious char-
acter to the practice; it was made clear, however, that the first amend-
ment, even if properly invoked, would not have helped Reynolds.
Justice Waite speculated that if polygamy could be justified as a re-
ligious exercise the Court would have no leeway if it were confronted
with a similar justification for human sacrifice or suttee, and declared
that "[1] aws are made for the government of actions, and while they
cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with
practices." '36
If Reynolds had been decided after Sherbert v. Verner, it would have
been interesting to discover the nature of the paramount interest to
which polygamy would be a "grave abuse;' 13 in other areas, however,
that interest has been stated clearly enough. In Prince v. Massachu-
setts,-3 for instance, a mother was convicted under a state child labor
law when she allowed her nine-year old child to distribute Jehovah's
Witnesses literature on the street at night. The Court sustained the con-
viction, holding that the activity, although religious, could be prohibited
because of the state's overriding regulatory interest in child welfare.
And in Braunfeld v. Brown'3 9 a Sabbatarian merchant attacked a state
Sunday-closing law, 6ut lost on the grounds that the law furthered a
legitimate state interest in providing one uniform day of rest and left
Mr. Braunfeld perfecdy free to observe his own Sabbath, albeit at a
financial loss.
Cases of this sort look to the regulation of socially offensive religious
practices. Withdrawal of the conscientious objector exemption, how-
ever, would constitute social compulsion of religiously offensive prac-
tices. It is one thing to protect a social policy by curtailing religious
activity which threatens it; it may be quite another thing to compel
an individual to participate in the social policy by affirmative actions
which violate his conscience. The effects of the two types of regula-
tion are not the same, and the regulations themselves should not be
judged by the same standards. As Chief Justice Stone wrote,
however rigorous the state may be in repressing the commission of
acts which are regarded as injurious to the state, it may well stay its
135 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
136 Id. at 166.
137 See text at note 92 supra.
138 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
139 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
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hand before it compels the commission of acts which violate the
conscience.' 40
It was precisely to this latter category of regulation, where affirmative
action is compelled in violation of an individual's conscience, that the
Court addressed itself in Sherbert v. Verner.Y There a woman who
refused employment requiring her to work on her Sabbath was denied
unemployment benefits under a statute which conditioned eligibility
on availability for any suitable employment. The Court held that
to condition the availability of benefits upon this appellant's willing-
ness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith effectively
penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties. 142
The principle of Sherbert is stronger in some ways when applied to
the problem of compelling exemptions for conscientious objectors. Mrs.
Sherbert was not required to violate her faith; she was merely denied
a benefit if she failed to do so. The strong language the Court used in
her case indicates language stronger still might be expected if she had
been placed, as an unexempted conscientious objector would be, under
an affirmative obligation to act contrary to her religious obligations.143
On the other hand, the relief Mrs. Sherbert sought obviously did not
threaten to jeopardize the administration of the secular scheme involved.
An argument alleging such a threat to the Selective Service System
might be raised against the asserted constitutionally compelled consci-
140 Stone, supra note 27, at 268. The Chief Justice also commented that
there may be and probably is a very radical distinction between compelling a
citizen to refrain from acts which he regards as moral but which the majority
of his fellow citizens and the law regard as immoral or unwholesome to the
life of the state, on the one hand, and compelling, him on the other hand to
do affirmative acts which he regards as unconscientious and immoral ...
[Clompelling the citizen to refrain from doing an act which he regards as
moral and conscientious does not do violence to his conscience; but conscience
is violated if he is coerced into doing an act which is opposed to his deepest
convictions of right and wrong.
Id.
141 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
142 Id. at 406. It may not be useful to attempt to reconcile Sherbert and Braunfeld
at all; clearly Mr. Braunfeld lost trade to his competitors if he observed his own
Sabbath as well as the statutory day of rest, while a similar consequence to Mrs.
Sherbert was held unconstitutional. The statute did leave Mr. Braunfeld free to observe
his own Sabbath if he wished to, however, a freedom effectively denied to Mrs. Sherbert
by the South Carolina regulation.
143 See Brodie & Southerland, Conscience, The Constitution, and The Supreme Court:
The Riddle of United States v. Seeger, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 306, 321.
1968] 1391
Virginia Law Review[
entious objector exemption. However, this kind of argument has been
dealt with in an analogous context and in a way entirely suitable to the
settlement of the conscientious objector problem. A Mrs. Jenison, mind-
ful of the Biblical injunction "judge not lest ye be judged," refused
jury duty and was convicted for it in a state court. The Supreme Court
reviewed the case and remanded it for reconsideration in the light of
Sherbert, which had just been handed down.'" On remand, the Min-
nesota supreme court found no adequate showing of any overriding state
interest and held that unless
the indiscriminate invoking of the First Amendment poses a serious
threat to the effective functioning of our jury system, any person
whose religious convictions prohibit compulsory jury duty shall
henceforth be exempt.145
Whether or not the Court could find a constitutional mandate for the
conscientious objector exemption turns upon the application given
Sherbert. That case appears to confine limitations on free exercise to
situations where the religious practice constitutes a "grave" abuse, "en-
dangering paramount interests," and where the state can show that there
is no alternative form of regulation which would protect the state in-
terest without limiting free exercise.' 4 When the regulation takes the
form of compelling the individual affirmatively to violate his religious
tenets, rather than merely requiring him to refrain from religious ac-
tions inimical to some secular value, it is reasonable to suppose that the
state's burden of demonstrating both the paramountcy of its interest and
the absence of alternative means of serving it will be increased. 47
144 1n re Jenison, 375 U.S. 14 (1963).
145 In re Jenison, 267 Minn. 136, 137, 125 N.W.2d 588, 589, rev'g, 265 Minn. 96, 120
N.W.2d 515 (1963).
14 6 See text at note 89 supra.
147 One commentator has analyzed the distinction between state restriction of con-
scientious action and state compulsion of acts repugnant to conscience in terms of the
blood transfusion issue, and concludes that a person may be required to submit to
transfusions contrary to his religious convictions only where the state's interest in the
welfare of minor children requires the parent to be kept alive. Galanter, Religious
Freedoms in the United States: A Turning Point?, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 217. See In re
Brooks' Estate, 32 IMI. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965). Mrs. Brooks had no minor
children, and, while conscious, refused transfusions; she had even signed a release to
the hospital from all liability for failure to give transfusions. A conservator was ap-
pointed while Mrs. Brooks was unconscious, and he authorized transfusions. The
treatment was not successful and, after Mrs. Brooks' death, the appointment of the
conservator and his authorization of the transfusion were held violative of the de-
[Vol. 54:13551392
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The state's interest in being able to defend itself is undeniably para-
mount. 4" It is empirically clear, however, that an exemption for
pacifist religious objectors does not endanger that interest or impair the
conscription system. It follows under Sherbert that an exemption at
least as broad as that afforded by the present statute is constitutionally
required, whether Congress provides it or not. If an administrative
necessity argument were raised against compelling an exemption broad
enough to include all religious objectors, pacifist or selective, the ap-
proach used in In re Jenison would dispose of the problem.'49 It appears,
therefore, that if the Court responded to a due process attack on "war in
any form" by extending the present statute to include religious selective
objectors, the free exercise clause as applied in Sherbert would require
invalidation of any retaliatory effort by Congress to repeal the exemp-
tion altogether.
CONCLUSION
The initial obstacle to a consideration of the constitutional merits of
a selective objection claim is the notion that no selective objector can
cedent's constitutional rights. This decision appears to carry the "paramount interest"
test as far as it will go.
148 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), discussed note 92 supra.
149 Giving any exemption at all to religious objectors has been attacked as a viola-
tion of the establishment clause. Cf. Donnici, supra note 37, at 37-38. However, a
definitive answer to this objection is provided by Justice Brennan's concurring opinion
in School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963). Justice Brennan
spoke of the "paradox" presented by "the logical interrelationship between the Estab-
lishment and Free Exercise Clauses [which] may produce situations where an injunction
against an apparent establishment must be withheld in order to avoid infringement of
rights of free exercise." Id. at 247. The necessity of the paradox to avoid free exercise
violations compels a construction of the establishment clause which directs the govern-
ment to be neutral but not hostile towards religion. See Zorach v. CIauson, 343 US.
306 (1952); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Reasoning from this con-
struction, Justice Brennan stated that neutrality is violated by Government sponsorship
of religious exercises in public schools, but that refusal to provide chaplains for pris-
oners or soldiers "cut off from all civilian opportunities for public communion" would
be hostility, not neutrality, as would denial of exemption for ministers and consci-
entious objectors. 374 U.S. at 299. Since the establishment compels only neutrality,
and governmental failure to provide the exemption would be hostility, it follows that
the clause does not force Congress to refrain from exempting religious objectors.
A contrary view might be based on Professor Kurland's unitary reading of the
first amendment, which would permit no classification whatever in terms of religion.
P. KuR.LAN, RELIGION AN im LAW 112 (1962). The Court implicitly rejected that
approach in Schempp, however, and its conceptual inadequacy has been demonstated
by Professor Schwartz, who finds the establishment clause limited to instances where
religion is sought to be imposed, a problem not presented by exemption of religious
objectors. Schwartz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment Clause Value, 77
YALE L.J. 692, 693-701 (1968).
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base his claim on "religious training and belief." It is clear, however,
under the broad interpretation given that phrase in Seeger, that some
selective objectors may qualify, and to deny them exemption as a matter
of law arbitrarily discriminates among forms of religious belief.
The only grounds for excluding religious selective objectors from
the exemption would be the threat their recognition would present to
the administration of the Selective Service System. There is no evi-
dence that the number of such claims would be so great that the na-
tion's ability to maintain an army would be imperiled. The remaining
problem would be whether the present system is equipped to winnow
the sincere claims from the spurious; and existing procedures, insofar
as they are adequate to handle the claims of pacifist objectors, are
also adequate to handle those of selective objectors.
Once the possibility of religious motivation for selective objection
is granted, and the administrative necessity arguments against recogniz-
ing that form of objection are overcome, there is no reason why a due
process attack on the present statute should not be sustained. The Seeger
decision, viewed in terms of what the Supreme Court did rather than
in terms of what the Court said it was doing, would permit no other
result.
The more delicate question is whether the Court would agree to hear
such a case at all, given its possible reluctance to extend the scope of
the exemption one more step beyond the limits Congress clearly in-
tended to impose upon it, at the risk of public outcry in time of war
and possible legislative elimination of all exemptions whatever. That
risk was run in Seeger, but not until a conflict between two circuits and
a petition from the Government brought the problem squarely before
the Court. A similar situation might be required to goad the Court into
hearing a case of selective objection on its constitutional merits.
It is clear, however, that such a case deserves to be heard, and that
ample law exists which would compel recognition of a religious selective
objector's claim to exemption. It is equally clear that no interest of
the state requires the infringement of first amendment rights involved
in continued failure to recognize such a claim. In the event the Court
recognizes the claim, there should be no doubt of its duty under the
Constitution to compel exemption of all sincere religious objectors, even
absent a statute providing such an exemption.
